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Ala~lract--An argument is made thai, so far from being a disease which is unstoppable in its epidemic 
consequences, AIDS has produced an epidemic, which owes its present virulence to sociological con- 
figurations of rather recent existence. Instead of a vigorous attack on the transmission chain of the 
epidemic, the emphasis of public health policy has been on finding a vaccine and/or a cure of the disease 
which produces the epidemic. By means of a simple model, it is argued that by simply closing businesses 
catering to high contact rate anal sex, e.g sexually oriented bathhouses, the American public health 
establishment might have avoided most of the tragic consequences of the present epidemic. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1980s, after some decades without the onslaught on the developed nations of a fatal 
contagious disease with a high rate of occurrence, America became aware, of a mysterious "new" 
disease, which has been named Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. Some have compared it
with some of the epidemics which plagued Europe in an earlier age: cholera, the Bubonic Plague, 
smallpox. Death totals in the United States alone have been forecast in the millions. A massive 
program of research into the development ofa vaccine and/or a cure has been instituted. By 1987, 
a number of polls revealed that AIDS was the item of single greatest concern to the American 
electorate---exceeding nuclear war, takeover by a foreign power or hard economic times. Into the 
secure Yuppie age has entered a new element, which most citizens had never dreamed could 
occur---catastrophe by epidemic. We wish to look at a simple model of the epidemic which may 
give us insight into the causes of the disease, its anticipated course, and an analysis of public health 
management of the epidemic. 
On 13 April 1982, Congressman Henry Waxman [1, p. 144], stated in a meeting of his 
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, "I intend to fight any effort by anyone at any level 
to make public health policy regarding Kaposi's sarcoma or any other disease on the basis of his 
or her personal prejudices regarding other people's exual preferences or life styles." This statement 
and similar ones made by other political figures were interpreted by many public health authorities 
that whatever strategies were to be employed in the war on AIDS, those which interfered with any 
variety or quantity of homosexual ctivity were not to be used. 
A customary approach to the control of contagious diseases in contemporary America is via 
medical intervention, either by preventive vaccination or by the use of antibiotics. Historically, 
sociological control of epidemics has been the more customary method. This has been due, in part, 
to the fact that vaccines were unknown before the nineteenth century and antibiotics before 
the twentieth century. But is is interesting to note that for some of the classical diseases which 
have caused epidemics in the past, e.g. cholera and the Bubonic Plague, the world is still without 
either effective vaccination or cure. Even when vaccines and/or cures for contagious disease are 
developed, such developments generally require years of research. Based on millenia of experience, 
it would appear that sociological control of an epidemic, rather than one based on an anticipated 
vaccine or cure, should be the first line of defense against a contagious disease, particularly a
"new" one. 
In the case of some ancient peoples, a large portion of the system of laws dealt with the means 
of sociological control of epidemics. For example, it should be noted that the 13th, 14th and half 
of the 15th chapter of Leviticus (131 verses) are dedicated to the sociological control of leprosy. 
We might contrast his with the fact that the often mentioned ietary (kosher) laws receive only 
one chapter, the 1 lth, with a total of 47 verses. In the case of AIDS, we see a disease for which 
medical control, once a patient has acquired the disease, is even more difficult than for leprosy. 
However, it does not follow that an incurable disease should produce more virulent epidemics than 
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a disease like leprosy, which is generally regarded as crippling rather than fatal. AIDS, unlike 
leprosy, is not transmitted by casual contact. Consequently, we should expect hat the transmission 
chain is much more fragile for AIDS and that relatively painless epidemiological policy can be used 
to stop an AIDS epidemic. 
On 1 December 1987, during an NBC presidential debate, Vice-President George Bush 
announced that the federal expenditures on AIDS research (i.e. seeking a vaccine or cure) were 
at levels higher than those either for cancer or heart disease. Unfortunately, a vaccine or a cure 
is extremely unlikely in the near future. Accordingly, we are confronted with a disease with a 100% 
fatality record and a per patient medical cost (using the present heroic intervention) in the 
$100,000/case range. We must ask the question of whether the main thrust of attack on the AIDS 
epidemic an be deemed optimal or even intelligent. 
Let us consider an argument, developed by Thompson [2], when the disease was first beginning 
to produce deaths in the several hundreds. In the model, we have a number of simplifying 
assumptions. For example, we first disregard time lag effects between exposure to the disease and 
transformation from susceptible to infective. We assume uniform mixing. Also, we have excluded 
from consideration the addition of heterosexual nd bisexual populations as well as that of i.v. drug 
users. The size of the target population is, of course, arguable (many will take a sociologically 
identifiably gay target community of 3,000,000 to be a serious underestimate), and a number of 
other sizes of the target population could have been presented. However, the inclusion of these 
complexities and modifications would not significantly change the conclusions of this paper. 
First of all, we can determine the probability that a random infective will transmit he disease 
to a susceptible during a time interval [t, t + At]. 
X 
Pr [transmission i  (t, t + At)] = k~At X + Y '  (1) 
where 
k = number of contacts per month; 
= probability of contact causing AIDS; 
X = number of susceptibles; 
Y = number of infectives. 
To obtain the expected total increase in the infective population during [t, t + At], we multiply the 
above by Y, the number of infectives. 
AE(Y) = Y Pr(transmission in [t, t + At]). (2) 
For large populations, we can assume, under fairly general conditions, that the expected total 
change in Y is a very nearly equal to a deterministic Y, i.e. 
AE(Y) ~ AY. (3) 
Letting At go to zero, this yields, immediately 
d Y koeXY 
dt X+ Y '  
dX k~XY 
- (4 )  
dt X+Y"  
We must also allow for immigration into the susceptible population, 2, and emigration,/~, from 
both the susceptible and infective populations and for marginal increase in the emigration from 
the infective population due to AIDS, ?, from sickness and death. Thus we have the improved 
differential equation model 
d Y k~XY 
d--t =X+ Y (? +#)Y '  
dX k~XY 
- -  + ~ - uX ,  (5)  
dt X+ Y 




Fig. I. Heterosexual transmission pattern. 
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Fig. 2. Homosexual transmission pattern. 
where 
= marginal AIDS death rate; 
2 = immigration rate; 
/~ = emigration rate, 
all time rates in months. 
For early stages of the disease, X/(X + Y) ~ 1. Accordingly, we may write the approximation: 
dY 
d--t- ~ [kct - /~ - 2, ] Y. (6) 
This gives us the solution: 
Y = Y(0) exp{[kct - # - ~]t}. (7) 
Now, we shall use some rough estimates for some of the parameters in the equations above. We 
shall assume that, absent AIDS, the total target population is 3,000,000. We shall assume that an 
individual stays in this population an average of 15 y (yielding/t = 1/(15x 12)= 0.00556). We will 
use as the average time an infective remains infective l0 months (yielding ~ = 0.1). To maintain 
the population of 3,000,000 (absent AIDS), then we require 
dX 
- -  = 2 - ~,X = 0 ,  (8 )  
dt 
or 2 = 16,666. Now, if we combine these figures with early death data from AIDS, we can use the 
approximation for Y to obtain an estimate for k~ ~ 0.263. Considering that some values of k which 
have been variously reported range up to well over 100 per month, we are struck by the low 
probability of infection per contact (~) between an infective and a susceptible. This rate is 
exceptionally ow, probably well below 0.01. This is very low, when compared to other venereal 
diseases, where values of this probability in excess of 0.2 are not unusual. It is this very low 
probability of transmission of AIDS which distinguishes its epidemiological properties from customary 
venereal diseases and gives the key to the fragility of the current AIDS epidemic. The low value of 
indicates virus in some quantity is required for transmission of the disease in most case. This 
means that transmission is much more likely from the active to the passive partner. In Fig. 1, we 
note that this essentially "deadends" the disease in heterosexual transmission. 
In the case of homosexual transmission (Fig. 2), where participants typically play both active 
and passive roles, the situation is quite different. 
In Table 1 we show predicted and observed [3] AIDS figures using the estimated parameters. 
Now, using the somewhat smaller ka value of 0.25 and an initial infective population of 2000, 
Table 2 shows the projections making the assumption that things continue with the parameter 
values shown in Table 1. "Cumulative deaths" refers to individuals who have passed into a stage 
of low infectivity. 
Any visibility of a degenerative and fatal disease in the proportion range of a few percent of the 
target population will almost certainly cause members of that population to consider modifying 
Table 2. Projections of AIDS with k,, = 0.25 
Year Cum. deaths Fraction infective 
Table 1. AIDS cases l 6434 0.004 
Date Actual Predicted 2 42,210 0.021 
3 226,261 0.107 
May 82 255 189 4 903,429 0.395 
Aug. 82 475 339 5 2,003,633 0.738 
Nov. 82 750 580 10 3,741,841 0.578 
Feb. 83 1150 967 15 4,650,124 0.578 
May 83 1675 1587 20 5,562,438 0.578 
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their membership in it. In the days of the plague in Western Europe, one could attempt o leave 
centers of congested population. It would appear likely that AIDS will cause a diminution of 2 
and k and an increase of #. We note that the period for doubling the number of AIDS cases in 
the United States in 1982 was essentially 5 months, but has increased to a year at present [4]. 
Let us consider, for example, the effect of diminishing k. We note that in the early stages of the 
disease, an equilibrium value of k~ = 0.1056 is obtained. At this value, with all other parameters 
held constant, the total "cumulative deaths" after 20 y is 47,848 with a fraction of infectives 
quickly reaching 0.000668. Now, let us suppose that fear reduces k to 20% of 0.25, by the use 
of condoms and some restraint in activity. Then, Table 3 shows that the disease quickly retreats 
into epidemiological insignificance. 
But let us suppose that a high contact fraction, p, retains a k~ value z times that of the less 
active population. Our model becomes 
d Yi k~Xl ( Yi + z Y2) 
(~, + ~)Y,, 
dt X, + Y, + z ( Y2 + X2) 
dY 2 ko~zX2(YI+I:Y2) - -=  (r +u)r2, 
dt X~ + Y~ + z ( Y2 + X2) 
dXj k~Xl ( Yl + z Y2) 
- + (1 -p )2  - /~X, ,  
dt X, + Y, + z ( Y~ + X2) 
dX2 kctTX2( Yl Jr- ~Y2) 
- -  = + p2 -/zX2. (9) 
dt XI -F YI -+- z ( Y2 -F X2) 
Let us examine conditions under which the epidemic is not sustainable if, starting with no 
infectives, a small number of infectives is added. We note that if Y~ = Y2 = 0, the equilibrium 
values for X~ and )(2 are (1 -p ) (2 /#)  and (p)(2/#), respectively. Then, expanding the right-hand 
sides of the two equations in a Maclaurin series, we have (using lower case symbols for the 
perturbations from 0), 
] k~(1 -p) dy~ -k~(1 -p )  (Y+#)  Y,+ Y2 
-d-i = 1 -p  + zp 1 -p  + zp 
dy~ kctzp I kctz2p (Y +#)]Y2 .  
dt = 1 -p  + zp y~ + 1 -p  + zp 
The solutions to a system of the form 
dyl 
d-T = ayl -~ by2' 
(10) 
are given by 
dy2 
dt = cyl + @2, (11) 
Yl (t) = cl exp(rl t) + c2 exp(r2 t) 
r 2 -- d 
Y2 (t) = cl exp(rl t) + c2 T exp(r2 t), (12) 
where 
a + d + x/(a + d) ~ - 4(ad - bc) 
r) = 2 ' 
a + d - ~/(a + d) 2 - 4(ad - be) 
r2 = 2 (13) 
In order that y) and Y2 go to zero, and hence the epidemic be not sustained, we require r~ and r2 
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Table 4. Projections of AIDS with k,, = 0.05, ~ = 5, 
p =O.lO 
Table 3. Projections of AIDS with k~ = 0.05 Year Cum. deaths Fraction infective 
Year Cure. deaths Fraction infective I 2100 0.0005 
2 4102 0.0006 
I 175 ! 0.00034 3 6367 0.0007 
2 2650 0.00018 4 9054 0.0008 
3 3112 0.00009 5 12,274 0.0010 
4 3349 0.00005 10 40,669 0.0020 
5 3471 0.00002 15 105,076 0.0059 
10 3594 0.000001 20 228,065 0.0091 
to be negative. Substituting in equation (13) from equations (10), we note that this is achieved if 
k~ zp + 1 -._p_p (14) 
r + .  
For a population with ~ = 1 or p = 0, we note that the average contact-transmission rate is simply 
k~ and the disease is not sustained if 
k~t <y  +/~. (15) 
For ~ > 1 and p > 0, however, the average contact-transmission rate is k0t[(1 -p )+ zp]. 
One measure of enhancement of marginal increase in disease sustainability due to a subpopula- 
tion exhibiting greater sexual activity than the average is given by the ratio Q of the overall 
contact-transmission average required to sustain the disease in the homogeneous case divided by 
that for a population with a relatively high activity subpopulation: 
1-p  +T2p 
Q = (1 -p  +zp)  2" (16) 
In Fig. 3, we exhibit a graph of  Q for various activity multipliers ~ and proportions p of  the more 
active subpopulation. 
Let us now generalize the system in equations (9) to include time delays from exposure to 
infectivity 
dWl kctX, ( Y, -~- TY2) - 
dt =,I", + Y, q-'~(Y2q-X2) 
d W 2 ka~X2( Y, + ~ }'2) 
dt X~ + Y1+ z ( Y2 + X2) 
d Y~ 
- -  =#W~-( l~  + Y)Y~, 
dt 
d-T = #w: -  + r)Y:, 














kaX,(Y, +  Y2) 
Xl + Y, + ~(Y2 + X2) 
t- (1 -p )2  - #X~, 
k~tTX2( Y, + T Y2) 
X, + Y, + z ( Y2 + X2) 
~- p2 -/~X2. 
I 
2 $ 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
'C  
Fig. 3. Multipliers of  s~ inab i l i ty  ( -e -  P = 0.05; -O-  P = 0.10; - i s -  p = 0.20). 
(17) 
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Here, we use the symbol W to indicate an intermediate individual who has been infected by AIDS 
but is not yet able to transmit he disease to others. The Y populations are the individuals who 
are able to transmit he disease to others. Transformation from the W state to the Y state is at 
rate ft. By going through a lengthy perturbation argument, using Laplace transforms, we find that 
in the case of time delay between transmission and infectivity shown in equations (17), the epidemic 
is not sustained if 
krt Tp+l -p  (fl +/~)(/~ + T) (18) - - <  
7+# "c2p + I --P fl 
The enhancement factor due to heterogeneity of contact rate is precisely that given in equation 
(16). Thus Fig. 3 applies even when we add the more realistic assumption of a time delay between 
transmission and infectivity. 
We note how dramatically the presence of a small subpopulation with significantly higher sexual 
activity than that of the majority of the group enhances ustainability of the epidemic. Conse- 
quently, we note the very real possibility that, had the public health authorities in the various 
municipalities in the United States simply revoked, early on, the licenses of bathhouses and other 
establishments which facilitate very high contact rate activity of anal intercourse, the disease of 
AIDS might never have reached epidemic proportions in this country. Even more intriguing is the 
question as to whether absent the liberalized licensing regulations of such establishments 
promulgated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, AIDS would ever have developed in significant 
numbers. It is interesting to note that many leaders of the gay community requested bathhouse 
closings from the early days of the epidemic but were generally rebuffed by the municipal public 
health authorities until mid-1984 or later, when fear induced avoidance of such establishments had 
already contributed to their decline [1, pp. 328, 431,441-443, 454, 464]. 
To examine from a slightly different angle the effect of a subpopulation with much greater 
activity than the rest of the group, in Table 4, we consider the case where k~ = 0.05, r = 5, and 
p = 0.1. Note that here 90% of the population has reduced its contact rate to that which, in Table 
3, produced a rapid disappearance of the disease. 
We notice how the presence of even a small subpopulation with a high contact rate can stop 
the demise of the epidemic. But, if this proportion becomes ufficiently small, without further 
increase in the activity multiplier, then the disease is removed from an epidemic to an endemic 
situation, as we see in Table 5 with p = 0.05 and all other parameters the same as Table 4. 
The dramatic effect of a small high contact rate subpopulation may be considered in the case 
where 90% of the population has a k~ of 0.02 and 10% has a k~t of 0.32. This gives a population 
with an overall k~ of 0.05. If this low value is maintained uniformly across the population, then 
we have seen that the disease quickly dies out. But consider the situation in Table 6 where the mix 
is given as above. 
Thus, it is quite clear that, with the same overall group average contact rate, a population 
exhibiting homogeneous activity is much more resistant to sustaining an epidemic than one with 
a small high contact rate subpopulation. 
It is now clear that the presence of AIDS in the human population is of long standing. We have 
AIDS-producing virus in United States human blood specimens going back at least to 1969, in 
specimens from human blood in Zaire at least as far back as 1959 [5]. Furthermore, we now have 
virological evidence [6] that AIDS is of ancient origin. At least in the case of AIDS, the virologist's 
maxim that all diseases are old diseases eems validated. 
Table 5. Projections of AIDS with k~, = 0.05, z = 5, 
p =0.05 
Table 6. Projections of AIDS with k~t = 0.02, r ~ 16, 
p =0.1 
l 1917 0.00043 I 2 ! 84 0.0007 
2 3272 0.00033 2 6536 0.0020 
3 4344 0.00027 3 20,583 0.0067 
4 5228 0.00022 4 64,157 0.0197 
5 5971 0.00019 5 170,030 0.042 l 
I 0 8263 0.00008 I 0 855,839 0.0229 
15 9247 0.00003 15 1,056,571 0.0122 
20 9672 0.00002 20 1,269,362 0.0182 
Year Cum. deaths Fraction infective Year Cum. deaths Fraction infective 
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Since AIDS is not a new disease, then we ought to ask what has changed in order than an 
endemic disease has now reached epidemic proportions. After all, we should recall that Belgian 
colonial troops went back and forth from Zaire to Belgium for nearly a hundred years. If there 
was ever a significant outbreak of AIDS in Belgium during the colonial epoch, no one has 
discovered the fact. It seems most likely that the reason is that the high contact rates which 
characterize some segments of the homosexual communities which exist in some American cities 
have never occurred before in the history of the world. 
Naturally there is concern as to whether AIDS can be sustained heterosexually in the United 
States. The main argument in support of such a possibility is the fact that the concurrent Central 
African AIDS epidemic is apparently almost completely a heterosexual phenomenon. How much 
of the African transmission is due to nonsexual modes, e.g. local health officials dispensing medical 
care with unsterilized needles and surgical instruments and how much is due to untreated lesions 
from other venereal diseases dramatically enhancing the possibility of female to male transmission 
(an essential mode if the epidemic is to be sustained heterosexually), is a matter of conjecture. But 
wc know that economic hard times have seriously stressed the quality of medicine in many African 
countries, and the two modes of transmission mentioned above may explain the heterosexual AIDS 
edpidemic there. If so, it is very likely that the AIDS epidemic in Africa is the indirect consequence 
of conditions of economic decline which are not likely to be matched anywhere in the United States. 
Of the 45,425 adult American cases of AIDS listed by the CDC on 16 November 1987, slightly 
less than 4% were effected by heterosexual transmission [7]. Of the 42,208 male cases, less than 
2% were heterosexually transmitted. Interestingly, of the 3217 female cases, 29% were the result 
of heterosexual transmission (the rest being by drug use and blood transfusion). The argument that 
female-to-male transmission is unlikely except in special circumstances like those mentioned above 
still squares with the data for five years into the epidemic. The indications are that conditions do 
not exist in the United States which can produce a stand-alone heterosexual epidemic. However, 
any failure of the American public health community to provide effective health care delivery to 
stop epidemics of other venereal diseases than AIDS in communities of the disadvantaged could 
facilitate a heterosexual AIDS epidemic in such communities. 
One possibility with AIDS is that there is a "Typhoid Mary" phenomenon. This means that a 
significant fraction of the infectives remain infective for long periods of time. To see the effects of 
such a phenomenon, let us suppose k~ -- 0.05, but 50% of those who contract he disease have 
a period of infectivity of 100 months instead of only 10 (see Table 7). 
Such a disastrous cenario is, naturally, made much worse as we increase the fraction of those 
with the long sexually active life expectancy. For example, if this proportion is 90%, we have 
Table 8. 
If the Typhoid Mary phenomenon were an actuality, then the effect of AIDS could be 
catastrophic ndeed. (Note that no presence of an exceptionally active subpopulation is necessary 
to cause this catastrophic scenario.) However, this would imply that AIDS was a new disease, 
since such a phenomenon would have sustained the epidemic in an earlier time. As pointed out 
above, we have evidence that AIDS is an old disease. Furthermore, a significant Typhoid Mary 
phenomenon would appear to work against the aforementioned continual engthening of the 
doubling time for observed cases of the disease. 
Table 7. Projections of AIDS with k,, m 0.05 and 
half of the infectives with 3' = 0.01 
Table 8. Projections of AIDS with k~ = 0.05 and 
90% of the infectives having ~, = 0.01 
1 1064 0.00066 I 457 0.0094 
2 1419 0.00075 2 1020 0.0013 
3 2801 0.00089 3 1808 0.0020 
4 3815 0.00110 4 2943 0.0028 
5 5023 0.00130 5 4587 0.004 I 
10 16,032 0.00330 I 0 32,911 0.0260 
15 44,340 0.00860 15 194,154 0.1441 
20 I 15,979 0.02210 20 776,146 0.4754 
Year Cum. deaths Fraction infective Year Cure. deaths Fraction infective 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Among the developed nations, the United States has much the highest incidence of AIDS. On 
the basis of cases per 100,000 population, the American rate is four times that of Canada, six times 
that of Denmark (which recently legalized homosexual marriages) and 12 times that of the United 
Kingdom (where gays have, on the average, eight different partners per year). Is the United States 
simply demonstrating AIDS incidence rates which will be matched by the other developed nations 
at a later time? I doubt it. 
American public health authorities have been, in my view, far more sympathetic than those in 
other countries to the legalization of establishments, such as gay bathhouses, which facilitate high 
incidence anonymous anal intercourse. That a small subpopulation with a contact rate much higher 
than that of the rest of the target group (even if the overall contact rate of the group is held 
constant) should have such a dramatic effect on facilitating the crossing of the epidemic threshold 
is, perhaps, surprising. It surprised me when I developed the model in 1983. I still stand by its 
conclusions in 1989. 
Some will object to the model as an oversimplification. Some workers in AIDS epidemiology 
feel that a truly accurate model will not be available for some years. But while we wait for the truly 
accurate model, the AIDS epidemic in the United States is running its course. In point of fact, many 
generalizations of the model are relatively simple. For example, if one wishes to use number 
of partners rather than number of contacts as the driving force behind the epidemic, the model 
can still be used. Other modifications, such as two separated epochs of high infectivity for each 
infective would require more work. I doubt if the conclusions concerning the bathhouses would 
be changed. When we utilize a model, as has been done here, not to make absolute xtrapolations, 
but rather to make comparisons under two different scenarios, we have taken an important step 
in "robustification". 
That AIDS has presented American public health with a new set of problems is undoubted. 
But a public health system which cannot deal effectively with new situations leaves much to be 
desired. 
In the long run, members of a target population will tend to take the necessary steps to lessen 
their participation in an epidemic. But it is the function of a public health establishment to 
shortcircuit he painful path dependent on experience of members of the target population. Had 
public health authorities vigorously attacked the transmission chain early on by shutting down 
high contact inducing establishments, he present AIDS holocaust in the American gay community 
might well have been avoided. 
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